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Societal, Managerial, and Legal
Perspectives on Corporate Social
Responsibility-Product and
Process*
By EDWIN M. EPSTEIN**
Introduction
The present symposium is concerned with corporate social respon-
sibility as it relates to the "structure and governance of the modern
American corporation." This focus is wise; for the public policy debate
about whether and how to increase the social responsiveness and public
accountability of the contemporary large business corporation in the
1980's, will, most likely, revolve around the interconnected issues of
corporate structure and corporate governance. The symposium's con-
tributors will examine the prospects for enhancing corporate respon-
siveness and accountability through both the internal restructuring of
the corporate governance process and the development of innovative
methods of external social control. My assignment, however, is some-
what different. The editors of this Journal have asked me to provide an
analytical overview and framework on the concept of social responsi-
bility which might aid the reader to better consider the thrust of the
symposium. In Part I, I shall discuss the reasons why people in the
United States have been particularly preoccupied with the social re-
sponsibilities of business enterprise and will relate this American pre-
occupation to our political history and pattern of economic
* This research was facilitated by a grant from the Institute of Business and Economic
Research, University of California, Berkeley, which funded the helpful research assistant of
Paul A. Tiffany, Ph. D. candidate, School of Business Administration Berkeley. The typing
and other support services of the Institute of Governmental Studies, Berkeley, are gratefully
acknowledged.
** A.B., 1958, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1961, Yale University; M.A., 1966,
University of California, Berkeley. Professor of Business Administration and Chairman of
the Political, Social and Legal Environmental Group, School of Business Administration,
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development. I shall then argue that Corporate Social Responsibility is
not simply an end result or a Product of correct corporate decisions.
Rather it is a Process, a method of decisionmaking whereby corporate
managers take account of the total consequences of their decisions in
determining company policies and practices (consistent with the limita-
tions of imperfect information and lack of omniscience as to distant
ramifications).
In Part II, I shall explore such important subsidiary issues as:
whether corporations are the proper parties to be invested with carry-
ing out public purposes; whether corporate goals need to be altered in
the light of such purposes; and whether corporations have responded to
public interest challenges, and have, in fact, altered their goals and ac-
tivities because of such challenges.
I will analyze these issues specifically as they relate to corporate
structure and governance. Further, I will recommend only those com-
prehensive changes that facilitate the institutionalization within the
megacorporation' of Corporate Social Responsibility both as Product
and as Process.
Part I
Corporateness, Size and Social Responsibility
Like such intellectual constructs as the economist's mythical
"firm" or the social and behavioral scientist's "organization," the term
"corporation" is a broad conceptual category encompassing highly di-
verse entities with widely differing societal roles.2 The City of Berkeley
(a municipality), the United Way of the Bay Area (a nonprofit associa-
1. The term "megacorporation," which first appeared a decade ago, has been popular-
ized by two recent books, P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
(1975) and M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION (1976). It refers to the
very largest business corporations which comprise the annual Fortune magazine lists and
constitute, both individually and in aggregate, the most important structures for the conduct
of economic activity within the United States and worldwide.
2. These issues are treated in R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE
FIRM (1963); W. EVAN, ORGANIZATION THEORY: STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND ENVIRON-
MENTS (1976); J. MCGUIRE, THEORIES OF BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (1964); C. PERROW, COM-
PLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY (1972); J. THOSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION
(1967); O. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR (1970); Church-
man, The New Rationalism and Its Implicationsfor Understanding Corporations, in RATION-
ALITY, LEGITIMACY, RESPONSIBILITY: THE SEARCH FOR NEW DIRECTIONS IN BUSINESS AND
SOCIETY 52 (E. Epstein & D. Votaw eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Churchman]; and Cyert
& Hedrick, Theory of the Firm.- Past, Present and Future. An Interpretation, 10 J. ECON. LIT.
398 (1972).
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tion), the University of California (a public body), Barrister, Solicitor
and Advocate, P.C. (a professional grouping), Mom-and-Pop Corner
Store, Co. (a neighborhood business), and the Standard Oil Company
of California (a multinational energy producer) are all corporations in-
corporated under the laws of the State of California. Although all of
these entities are engaged in the production and distribution of socially
useful goods and services, each performs a very different social task,
has different constituencies, affects widely divergent sectors of the pub-
lic, has different human and capital resources, and poses substantially
different issues of corporate power and accountability. "Corporate-
ness" per se therefore indicates very little about an institution's social
role and responsibilities. Given that fact, three important and related
points should be considered.
First, social responsibilities, however we may define them, arise
not from an organization's incorporated status but, rather, from the
societal power it possesses as a consequence of its normal, ongoing or-
ganizational activities. Were each of the above-named entities unin-
corporated bodies (as, indeed, some governmental units, law firms,
businesses, and charitable and educational institutions are), the neces-
sity to examine their relationships and responsibilities to other sectors
of society, would remain.
Second, although the discussion of corporate social responsibility
in the United States has been primarily concentrated on "private"
(shareholder-owned) business corporations, many of the issues that
have given rise to this discussion apply to nonbusiness corporations as
well. Publicly owned power and light companies have polluted air and
water, as have their investor-owned counterparts. Universities, govern-
mental bureaucracies, and not-for-profit agencies often have been
found as wanting in their affirmative-action efforts as have business
corporations. If social responsibility is viewed as Product, or the end
result of an organization's operations (i.e. specific actions that an or-
ganization takes or does not take), all significant social institutions,
business and nonbusiness alike, are subject to judgments regarding
whether they have acted responsibly or irresponsibly. Similarly, if so-
cial responsibility is considered to be a Process, or means of decision-
making whereby managers take into account the total consequences of
organizational policies and actions, then virtually all substantial orga-
nizations must confront the reality that what they do may affect wide
sectors of society.
Third, the size of a corporation does not dispose of the issues relat-
ing to its social imfipact and responsibilities. All corporations, great and
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small, affect other sectors of society by their operations and, conse-
quently, pose questions regarding their responsibilities. While the pre-
cise character of these responsibilities may differ, the existence of
responsibilities, in both the Product and Process senses, does not. Both
the City of San Francisco and the City of Emeryville have responsibili-
ties to their citizens, although the precise character of these responsibil-
ities may vary as a result of their differing population bases, sizes,
financial resources, and unique municipal problems. Similarly, Ala-
meda First National Bank and the Bank of America are both commer-
cial banks with responsibilities to employees, customers, and the
communities where they operate although, because of their vastly dif-
ferent sizes and scopes of operations, the nature of their other responsi-
bilities may differ.
Thus, all social organizations, irrespective of their size, have re-
sponsibility to other sectors of the society in which they operate; social
responsibility does not derive from corporate status per se or from a
certain corporate category: it inheres in the functional role and societal
impact of a particular institution.
A More Limited Context for Analyzing Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Megacorporation
The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility in the United
States arises from and refers specifically to the operations of the very
largest business firms, virtually all of which are incorporated, which are
the primary producers and distributors of socially valuable goods and
services. I refer here to General Motors, Bank of America, American
Telephone and Telegraph, and the other members of the investor-own-
er, publically listed group that populate the Fortune lists and are the
institutional leaders of American commerce and industry.3 It is the
modem emergence of a relatively limited number of very large corpo-
rate business enterprises as the institutional structure for conducting
the nation's most essential economic activities that has brought with it
3. These firms constitute but a very small percentage of the nearly 1,970.000 active
business corporations that filed federal income tax returns in 1974. Consider that only 3,755
corporations (.002% of the total population) reported assets of $100,000,000 and only 1,800
corporations (.001% of the total population) reported assets of $250,000,000 or more in 1974.
Table 914, Actipe Corporations by Asset Size and Industry: 1950 to 1974, U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 560 (1977). Only 242 indus-
trial firms in 1977 had sales of $1,000,000,000 or more. See The Fortune Directory of the 500
Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 240-48. Only an estimated
1,800 corporations in the early 1970's had 3,000 or more shareholders. M. EISENBERG. THE
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 42 (1976).
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the necessity of dealing with the question of corporate social responsi-
bility. The United States is virtually unique in that this issue of social
responsibility is the basis for much of the philosophical discussion con-
cerning the relationship of business to society.4 The characteristic Eu-
ropean debate, in contrast, has concerned the comparative virtues of
Capitalism, Socialism and Communism. This peculiarly American fo-
cus upon corporate social responsibility arises out of both our political
heritage and the crucial tole that large business corporations have
played in our national economic development.
The Corporate Enigma
The large business corporation is an enigma to the American con-
stitutional tradition of carefully delimited and tightly constrained
power.5 Although the largest of these firms possess diverse organiza-
tional resources that make them significant economic, social, and politi-
cal factors both domestically and, in their multinational form,
internationally, these corporations and their managers historically have
been restricted by both law and other more informal systems of social
control far less than governmental or quasi-governmental bodies and
the public officials who run them. Accordingly, the emergence of an
economic system based upon the large-scale business corporation has
raised, the fundamental issue of the power and legitimacy of the corpo-
ration within the American political tradition. Charles E. Lindblom
concluded his Politics and Markets,6 one of the most widely discussed
works on the American political economy written during the 1970's, by
saying: "It has been a curious feature of democratic thought that it has
not faced up to the private corporation as a peculiar organization in an
ostensible democracy. . . . The large private corporation fits oddly
into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit.' 7 Less dra-
matically but with considerable cogency, legal historian James Willard
Hurst has stated, "[W]e had yet, as of 1970, to achieve explicit, compre-
hensive criteria of the legitimacy of power held by large business cor-
4. Reasons for this particularly American concern with corporate social responsibility
are suggested in Epstein, The Social Role o/Business Enterprise in Britain: .An American Per-
spective: Part 1, 13 J. MGT. STUDIES 213 (1976); Epstein, The Social Role 0/Business Enter-
prise in Britain:.An American Perspective: Part II, 14 J. MGT. STUDIES 281 (1977).
5. This point is developed in Epstein, The Historical Enigma of Corporate Legitimacy,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 1701 (1972).
6. C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYS-
TEMS (1977).
7. .d. at 356.
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porations."'8 Hurst goes on to observe that while the dominant political
opinion has continued to accept the large business corporation as a le-
gitimate constituent element, society lacks confidence that we have
reached "a durable relation of such private power to the general consti-
tutional tradition of the society."9 Recent surveys suggest that public
confidence in big business (as well as in big labor and big government)
has declined during the near decade since the Hurst book appeared.' 0
The legitimacy of the American megacorporation remains an impor-
tant and pregnant issue.
Corporate Power and Legitimacy Reconsidered
The corporate legitimacy question arises from a democratic soci-
ety's need to define the reciprocal rights and obligations of important
social institutions. Hurst suggests that to be legitimate an institution
must be viewed by individuals and groups both within and without it
as rightful and proper; it must meet tests of utility and responsibility."I
The utility criterion is a pragmatic one and is determined by how well
the corporation "gets on" with its essentially economic job of produc-
ing and distributing desired goods and services. Responsibility re-
quires that institutional power be accountable to the judgment of
someone other than the power holder. In a democracy, the issues of
legitimacy and responsibility are inevitably linked in the context of
power. 12
It is analytically useful to divide the issue of corporate legitimacy
into two distinct components. First, there is the question of internal or
intra-corporate legitimacy which bears on the way in which large incor-
porated businesses are governed. This question raises such subsidiary
issues as the manner of selection and removal and the basis of authority
of corporate managers; the identity and rights of corporate constituen-
8. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 110 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HURST].
9. Id. at 153.
10. Lipset & Schneider, How's Business? What the Public Thinks, PUB. OPIN. Q..
July/Aug. 1978, at 41 [hereinfater cited as Lipset & Schneider].
11. HURST, supra note 8, at 58.
12. In a recent paper, Richard M. Abrams, a noted historian of American business, put
the matter succinctly: "Concentration of private economic power, giantism, and internation-
alization of business have led to justifiable fears that government lacks the capacity to make
the corporations accountable for their behavior to the social goals of the nation. This fact
puts a spotlight on the legitimacy issue." Abrams, The Modern Corporation. Legitimacy,
Responsibility, and Public Disclosure, in DISCLOSURE RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE THIRD PANEL DISCUSSION OF THE COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BU-
REAUS 3 (E. Boris & L. Mosher eds. 1978).
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cies; and the compatibility of the corporate governance system with
democratic norms. The second, or external, question concerns the obli-
gations and accountability of the corporation to diverse segments of the
society within which it operates. This external issue is what has been
popularized within the United States over the past two decades as the
"social responsibility" question.
Corporate Legitimacy: internal and external
In a report published in early 1978, the chairman of the American
Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Bank and Business Law,
summarized a number of the frequently alleged inadequacies of the
current internal system of corporate governance:
Corporations fail to anticipate reasonable public expectations
regarding their business activities and violate the law with impunity;
The corporate decision-making process is secretive and tightly
controlled, unresponsive to points of reference without the corpora-
tion itself;
Management, primarily through the Chief Executive Officer,
runs the corporation without accountability to the corporate board;
Outside directors fail in large part to discharge their legally as-
signed duties and responsibilities;
Court application of state corporation codes defining director re-
sponsibility fail to meet reasonable public expectations; and finally,
The entire matter must be addressed at the federal legislative
level to assure uniformity of application and accountability.
13
A virtual cornucopia of recent proposals for restructuring the cor-
porate governance process have been offered as response to these alle-
gations. These proposals include: (1) calls for passage of a Federal
Chartering Act or of Federal Minimum Standards legislation; (2) the
development of a two-tiered board system or other forms of "co-deter-
mination" with the objective of enhancing the quality of "workers' par-
ticipation"; (3) the requirement that company boards include
"Fulltime," "Professional," "Independent," "General Public" and
"Special Public" Directors; (4) the extensive use of outside directors on
important board committees (such as Audit, Nominating and Compen-
sation; (5) the prohibition of corporate management except for the
Chief Executive Officer from serving on company boards; (6) nation-
wide public election of corporate directors and; (7) reform of share-
holders' proxy and other voting rights to achieve a greater degree of
shareholder democracy.
14
13. Coombe, Chairman's Report: Corporate Governance, 33 Bus. LAW. 2079 (1978).
14. These and other proposals are presented and critiqued in RUNNING THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION (W. Dill ed. 1978); M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
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These and similar suggestions have been made so frequently and
forcefully that, in January 1978, the Business Roundtable, a group of
180 chief executive officers of major United States corporations, felt
obliged to issue a statement dealing with the "Role and Composition of
the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation."'
15
The statement, which eschewed setting forth detailed prescriptions and
dealt only with principles or guidelines, addressed the issues of (I) cor-
porate legitimacy and power, (2) the proper functions of the board, (3)
the establishing of systems and procedures for providing adequate in-
formation to the board, and (4) the organization and composition of
the board.
While the Roundtable statement recognized the need for some
changes in prevailing corporate board practices, such as giving an in-
creased role and authority to outside or nonmanagement directors both
on the board and on key committees, it has hardly satisfied advocates
of a bold restructuring the corporate governance process. As Kenneth
R. Andrews of the Harvard Business School has noted, however, the
value of the Roundtable document may not be so much "substantive as
catalytic"; it may energize members of the Roundtable to implement
the recommendations within their own companies. 16 The definitive cri-
tique of the structure of corporate governance has yet to be issued by
either representatives of the business community or their critics. The
issue of the internal legitimacy of the corporation will continue to be a
key feature of the great debate concerning the social role of American
business.
149-56 (1976); M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTHS AND REALITY (1971); C. STONE, WHERE THE
LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 122-248 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as STONE]; Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law. Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974); Chirelstein, Corporate Law Reform, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
BUSINESS PREDICAMENT 46 (J. McKie ed. 1974); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: To-
ward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L.
REV. 1099 (1977); Estes, The Emerging Solution to Corporate Governance, 55 HARV. Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 20; Weiss & Schwartz, Disclosure Approachfor Directors, 56 HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 18; A Symposium on Federal and State Roles in Establishing
Standards of Conductfor Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 859 (1976); Symposium, Current
Problems of Corporate Directors-Discharging Developing Responsibilities, 31 Bus. LAW 1219
(1976). Earlier materials pertinent to the subject are cited in Epstein, The Historical Enigma
of Corporate Legitimacy, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1701, 1702 n.4 (1972).
15. The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned
Corporation-Statement of the Business Roundtable, reprinted in 33 Bus. LAW. 2079, 2083
(1978).
16. Andrews, The Roundtable Statement on Boards of Directors, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 24, 30.
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It is, however, the external legitimacy question-the "corporate so-
cial responsibility" question-that most pointedly raises the issue of
business's obligations to other sectors of society. Large business corpo-
rations, more than virtually any other social institution, have aroused
apprehension regarding the nature, extent, and legitimacy of the power
of nongovernmental institutions. Power and responsibility are recipro-
cally correlated concepts in American society. The existence of the for-
mer inevitably raises issues concerning the character of the latter.
Similarly, freedom and responsibility are inextricably linked values in
a democracy; ideally the freedom of an institution should be propor-
tional to its responsible use of power.
What has been described as the "Gospel of Social Responsibil-
ity,' 17 an ideological emphasis within the business community upon
objectives and obligations other than profit maximization, dates from
the late 1950s and early 1960s. A deeper, more fundamental, concern
about business reponsibility, however, emerged during the late nine-
teenth century, when the American industrial economy was assuming
its modern form.' 8 In the first volume of the .4merican Journal of
Sociology published in 1895, Albion W. Small, one of the leading
figures in early American sociology, threw down a symbolic gauntlet to
the Age of Enterprise when he wrote, "[N]ot merely public office but
private business is a public trust."' 19 Few of his contemporaries, partic-
ularly among businessmen, were prepared to accept such an all-encom-
passing and challenging notion of business responsibility. Those bred
in an atmosphere of laissez-faire capitalism, a curious admixture of
classical economics, Neo-Calvinism, Social Darwinism, Lockian Politi-
cal Philosophy and a large component of antistatism, do not easily
adapt to a new relationship between business and society. Neverthe-
less, Small's writing reflected deepseated concern over the emergence of
the megacorporation. This concern included both a fear of the rapidly
spreading economic, political, and social power of these giant business
organizations and a need to render these businesses accountable to the
public.
17. Cheit, The New Place of.Business, in THE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT (E. Cheit ed.
1964).
18. See M. HEALD, THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS: COMPANY AND COM-
MUNITY, 1900-1960 (1970) [hereinafter cited as HEALD].
19. Small, Private Business is a Public Trust, I AMER. J. Soc. 276, 282 (1895).
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Corporate Social Responsibility: The Limitations of Legal Processes
With a few notable exceptions such as Louis D. Brandeis 20 and
John P. Davis,21 lawyers in the earlier period of United States industri-
alization were not developing new concepts of corporate social respon-
sibility. During the early 1930s, however, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr. conducted their classic debate in the pages of the
Harvard Law Review22 over the trusteeship obligations of corporate
managers. This debate, together with Berle's and Gardner C. Means',
The Modern Corporation and Private Property,23 shaped the discussion
of corporate social responsibility for both lawyers and nonlawyers for
more than a generation.
While lawyers themselves made relatively few conceptual contri-
butions, the legal process, on a more pragmatic level, has constituted
the primary means by which the public has imposed evolving standards
of corporate social responsibility and has sought to render business ac-
countable for an ever-widening sphere of activities. During the past
ninety years, and particularly since the 1930s, federal and state legisla-
tion, judicial decisions, and administrative regulations have dramati-
cally redefined the obligations of business to employees, competitors,
customers, suppliers, creditors, minority groups and women, the physi-
cal environment, various levels of government, and the general public.
The law has served to develop new standards of corporate respon-
sibility in both the Product (end result) and Process (means of decision-
making) senses. Legal standards regarding employees' wages and
hours, industrial health and safety, consumer protection, and anti-trust
and trade regulation pertain primarily to the outcomes or consequences
of corporate behavior. Laws concerning collective bargaining, affirma-
tive action, and shareholder protections under federal securities laws
are essentially process oriented: They deal with the manner in which
corporate management makes decisions affecting key constituencies
and the factors that management must consider in arriving at these de-
cisions. It is, however, sometimes difficult to determine whether legal
standards bearing on corporate social responsibility affect business op-
erations as Product or Process. Environmental legislation and regula-
20. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT (1914).
21. J. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS (1905).
22. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); Dodd,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Berle, For
Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
23. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1933).
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tions, for example, at once seek particular end results (cleaner air or
water or less noise) and specify standards and methods of decision-
making behavior (the gathering of information and the issuance of re-
ports about the "environmental impact" of business activity). The
Product-Process distinction is useful, however, in both the legal and
nonlegal contexts, in understanding two quite different approaches to
the question of corporate social responsibility.
It should be recognized, however, that, with the exception of secur-
ities law, the ongoing legal effort to define corporate responsibilities has
not, typically, focused on the corporation per se. Rather, it has been
addressed to all business organizations irrespective of their legal status
or size. It is, however, the megaenterprise functioning in the corporate
form that has generated the problems that have resulted in resort to the
legal system. Oddly enough, with the exception of securities law, it is
only recently that legal efforts to define and stimulate socially responsi-
ble corporate behavior have paid much attention to corporate structure
and corporate governance. There is today a widespread recognition
(ironically, most fully developed among lawyers) that the legal process,
while essential, cannot adequately define the societal role of business
institutions or make them truly responsible to the public. Christopher
D. Stone's recent work,24 provides compelling documentation of the
inherent inadequacies of legal mechanisms to deal with the complex
and dynamic relationships between business and society. Legal ac-
countability cannot be the exclusive means of determining the responsi-
bilities of American business. Law can only set a minimum standard of
responsible business behavior in those areas in which society has
evolved a clear standard of accountability. Beyond these agreed-upon
minimums, however, the law's inherent inability to respond to novel
situations has, if anything, exacerbated the argument over corporate
social responsibility.
Other Key Factors in the American Search for Corporate Social
Responsibility
Other factors in addition to the national preoccupation with corpo-
rate power and legitimacy, help explain the long-standing American
concern with the social responsibilities of business. One factor is this
country's strong ideological preference for "private" rather than "pub-
lie" (state) action. This preference has meant that large business orga-
nizations perform many essential economic functions that in other
24. STONE, sufpra note 14.
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countries are usually performed by state-owned entities. The provision
of basic transportation, communications, military production and raw
materials are illustrative. A dependency relationship between the busi-
ness community and other sectors of American society has therefore
arisen. In Western Europe, and in Great Britain in particular, the focus
has not been upon the question of social responsibility per se, but,
rather, on the more generic debate over the public ownership of essen-
tial economic resources. Further, in many European countries, impor-
tant societal leadership functions have been preempted by traditional
nonbusiness elites, including a titled, landed aristocracy and an estab-
lished church; business is a relatively new arrival on the scene. In the
United States, however, such traditional elite structures were much less
extensive, and business elites have assumed public leadership roles
from the very beginning. Historically, American business institutions
and their leaders have been given more scope and taken them far more
seriously than elsewhere. As a consequence Americans have expected
much more from business. When these expectations have not been
met, a sense of relative deprivation, a feeling that business has some-
how let the public down, has arisen.
25
Finally, and somewhat ironically, there has been rather wide ac-
ceptance in this country of an idea propagated for several decades by
the business community itself: business management is not simply an
occupation, but a profession. An important component of the concept
of professionalism is that of a responsibility to the public that ulti-
mately transcends the responsibility owed to an organization or to a
client. The idea has developed, therefore, that professional managers
have an obligation to examine fully the implications of their actions
and to take account of the impact of their decisions upon the "public
interest.''2 6 It is as a result of the factors discussed above, that the legit-
imacy of corporate behavior in the United States has been increasingly
evaluated by performance criteria that consider the total societal im-
pact of the firm and not simply its ability to maximize profits.
25. See, e.g., Lipset & Schneider, supra note 10, at 41; America's Growing Anti-Business
Mood, Bus. WEEK, June 17, 1972, at 100. The reactions of American corporate leaders to
public dissatisfaction with business performance is examined in L. SILK & D. VOGEL, ETH-
ICS AND PROFITS: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1976).
26. Preston, Corporation and Society. The Search for a Pardigm, 13 J. ECON. LiT. 434
(1975).
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Corporate Social Responsibility: The Search for Parameters: Product and
Process Examined
A general notion or ideology of corporate social responsibility has
achieved general acceptance during the past two decades within both
the American business community and the general public. There are,
however, no precise operational parameters for the concept. To be
sure, certain minimum standards are recognized; no one urges business
to act in a patently irresponsible or illegal manner, or to flagrantly dis-
regard contemporary community standards of behavior. 27 However,
beyond that minimum, there is no agreement regarding what consti-
tutes socially responsible behavior. The nature of social responsibility
as an issue, as opposed to an ideology, remains unresolved.
One of the salutary developments of the 1970s has been the recog-
nition by students of American business that it is not feasible to de-
velop a single, universal or eternal delineation of the societal role of the
business enterprise. Even the commonly accepted criterion of evaluat-
ing a firm's corporate social responsibility on the basis of whether it
legally and efficiently produces and distributes socially useful goods in
conformity with national public policy, is subject to exceptions and
qualifications. Consider the following examples: (1) microeconomic
efficiency may dictate the widespread substitution of machinery for
human labor thereby increasing the productivity of the firm but caus-
ing substantial regional unemployment in the process; (2) obeying the
law may require the firm to engage in governmentally mandated racial
discrimination, such as is the case in South Africa or Rhodesia; (3) con-
forming company interests to national public policy may require a
business firm to provide materials for an unpopular war. Thus, a firm's
actions, although efficient, legal, and in conformance with national pol-
icy, may still have certain socially undesirable consequences.
Social Responsibility as Product
Much of the difficulty we have experienced in arriving at a widely
acceptable and, more importantly, operationally useful definition of
corporate social responsibility inheres in our insistence in viewing so-
27. Even Milton Friedman, who has been one of the most articulate spokesman of the
"minimalist" position regarding corporate social responsibility, acknowledges the obliga-
tions of the firm "to stay within the rules of the game, which is to say, [to engage] in open
and free competition without deception or fraud," as it acts upon its one and only social
responsibility-"to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits."
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Friedman, The Social Responsibii y
of Business as to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, Magazine at 122.
May 1979] PERSPECTIVES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
cial responsibility solely in Product terms. The Product approach con-
siders social responsibility in terms of outcomes-whether management
has done the "right" thing or has achieved a recognizably "good" result
by making the "correct" decision. The following outcomes illustrate
what might currently be regarded as "socially responsible" company
behavior under the Product approach: reducing or eliminating the
amount of toxic effluents a firm puts into the environment, increasing
the proportion of high level jobs held by female, minority, and handi-
capped employees, improving the quality and increasing the longevity
of a company's products, and contributing company monies to support
good works within the community. All of these are, however, current
or contemporary notions of corporate social responsibility. The Prod-
uct or outcome analysis of social responsibility is both inherently dy-
namic and value-laden. It reflects a society's stage of economic
development, its most pressing societal needs, the specific configuration
of its political economy and the interrelationship of its key institutions,
prevalent ideologies, and cultural ethos. Former Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi illustrated the relativistic and variable character of the
Product-oriented view of social responsibility when, at the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, she ad-
monished participants from the highly industrialized western countries
by asserting that, while the curtailing of environmental pollution result-
ing from industrial production and other sources might be an impor-
tant problem to them, India and other less-developed nations were
grappling with the precedent, and for them much more pressing, prob-
lem of development and supplying their populations with the necessi-
ties of life. Important as the reduction of environmental pollution may
be, Gandhi argued, it was a third level concern for less-developed
countries. They would prefer the environmental pollution and the in-
dustrial production and the employment as first steps in addressing
their most pressing societal needs. Only when the development and
employment problems are largely solved could developing nations turn
their attention to the pollution problem. Today's concept of social re-
sponsibility as a Product is different for a manufacturing firm in Delhi
than for its counterpart in Detroit.
This discussion of the nature of social responsibility as Product has
focused upon the macro, or systemic, level of all large corporations.
Let us now turn to the problem of determining the social responsibili-
ties of a single firm when social responsibility is defined in problem-
solving terms as an end result or Product of corporate behavior. Just as
at the macro-level, the small firm's stage of development, the nation's
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political economy, and the prevalent social values will alter its social
responsibilities. Factors affecting a firm's perception of its social re-
sponsibilities include:
(1) its specific economic task,
(2) its competitive position,
(3) its unique relationship to any given social problem,
(4) the urgency of that problem,
(5) the availability within the firm of human,
(6) financial, and technological resources to address the problem,
(7) the availability of alternatives other than action by the firm,
(8) the likely consequences to the firm and to other social interests of
acting or failure to act in a given situation,
(9) the competing societal pressures and priorities faced by the firm,
and
(10) prevalent social values both within and without the firm.
The specific corporate responsibilities of a regional bank, for ex-
ample differ, substantially from those of an integrated multi-national
oil producer. Moreover, the societal obligations of a particular com-
pany vary over time, depending upon changing circumstances within
the firm and the shifting character of its operating environment.
Such a relativistic approach to corporate social responsibility may
not satisfy corporate critics or those line managers who seek total cer-
tainty in the standards by which their operating behavior is judged. An
absolutist, Mosaic Decalogue, carved into stone, prescribing a clear
code of conduct applicable at all times in all places would, undoubt-
edly, better serve their purposes. As students of Jewish law are fully
aware, however, the seemingly clear and precise Ten Commandments
have generated, over the period of three millenia, literally millions of
pages of Rabbinic commentary and interpretation arising out of the
case-by-case application of Mosaic law to specific factual circum-
stances. Similarly it is not possible to specify unalterable universal
standards of socially responsible business behavior. Stone's excellent
book offers a thoughtful listing of the various "attitudes desirable in
connection with each of the various social roles that the corporation
plays." These include the roles of: citizen, producer, employer, re-
source manager, investor, neighbor, competitor, and social designer.28
Stone provides a series of guidelines for each category.
The "corporation as employer," for instance, is concerned with the
safety of the work environment, the emotional well-being of its work-
ers, and in hiring and dealing with its employees in a nondiscrimina-
28. STONE, supra note 14, at 231-32.
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tory fashion. 29 These are laudable rules of thumb to which I fully
subscribe. Some years ago, I drew up my own set of principles of cor-
porate social responsibility and presented them at a meeting of senior
business executives. 30 I suggested that each firm has the following
responsibilities:
(1) To produce socially useful goods or provide a needed
service in as economically efficient a manner as is possible;
(2) To carry out this task lawfully and in a manner compati-
ble with the ethical standards and democratic values of Amer-
ican society.
(3) To do the above in a manner that best satisfies the mate-
rial and psychological needs of the work force in terms of
health, safety, dignity, opportunity for job satisfaction, orga-
nizational "due process," financial security, and career
advancement.
(4) To further the technology or "state of the art" within the
industry.
(5) To absorb the social costs ("externalities") attendant to
its operations so that they become part of the "cost of doing
business." These cost include safeguarding employees' indus-
trial health and safety, and abating air, water, and noise
pollution.
(6) To be aware that the firm's operations affect individuals,
groups, and communities in noneconomic ways.
(7) To conform company interest with the evolving "na-
tional interest" and to further the national interest through its
activities.
(8) To achieve a rate of profit which will enable the enter-
prise to survive and grow, thereby assuring that the firm's eco-
nomic task will be continued in the future, and that investors
and creditors will receive financial returns adequate to gener-
ate future investment.
(9) To work cooperatively with governmental and nongov-
ernmental groups and institutions to bring about the realiza-
tion of that elusive national goal, the "Good Society."
The inherent limitation to both my approach and Stone's is that
each admonition can have meaning only in the specific context of a
29. Id. at 23 1.
30. Epstein, The Futility of 'Fighting Back To ward a Positipe Social Rolefor Business in
the 1970s, in PROCEEDING: 16TH EXECUTIVES' SYMPOSIUM SAINT MARY'S COLLEGE 21-23
(Moraga, Ca., Feb. 7 & 8, 1973).
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given company's relationships with its unique operating environment.
31
Nevertheless a substantial number of companies have developed, over
the past few years, codes of socially responsible or ethical behavior.
32
An important strength of both formulations is that corporate social
responsibility as a Product is not judged by corporate philanthropy, it is
part of the day to day business of the firm.
Social Responsibility as Process
Corporate social responsibility can be usefully thought of as a
Process: a system of decisionmaking whereby corporate managers try
to anticipate and consider the total consequences of business policies
and operations before they act. What managers consider to be relevant
to formulating and implementing corporate policy encompasses not
only economic factors but also the social, political, environmental, and
cultural consequences of corporate action. This broader decision-mak-
31. Lee E. Preston and James E. Post have offered a useful guideline for determining a
firm's societal obligations. See L. PRESTON & J. POST, PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC
POLICY: THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 94-98 (1975). Their "principle of public
responsibility" holds that "the scope of managerial responsibility is not unlimited, as the
popular conception of 'social responsibility' might suggest, but specifically defined in terms
of primary and secondary involvement areas. Within the defined scope, the goals of mana-
gerial activity, their relative priority, and the criteria for appraising success and failure are
defined both by the market mechanism and by public policy." Id. at 95.
For Preston and Post, "[t]he area of primary involvement is determined by the special-
ized functional role of the organization, the role that defines its nature and social purpose
and that provides the basis for exchange relationships between it and the rest of society
.... The area of secondary involvement includes all those relationships, activities, and im-
pacts of the organization that are ancillary or consequential to its primary involvement ac-
tivities." Id. at 95-96.
32. A recent survey of 168 very large United States corporations by the Foundation of
the Southwestern Graduate School of Banking (Southern Methodist University) revealed
that 75 out of 79 respondents had developed some form of policy statement of their social
responsibilities. The study further suggests that the most useful of those policy statements
have been those which set out fairly specific standards of company behavior. Working Pa-
per for the Study of Corporate Policy and Governance, The Foundation of the Southwestern
Graduate School of Banking, Southern Methodist University (R. Johnson, Project Director,
June 1978). The SMU researchers identified seven distinguishable relationships between a
firm and its constituencies that were treated in corporate ethical policy statements: (1) inter-
national relationships-between American corporations and foreign countries, governments
and societies; (2) relationships to U.S. governments (federal, state, and local); (3) relation-
ships to U.S. society and local communities with regard to environment, energy, community
development, health, education, cultural activities, and charitable causes; (4) relationships to
customers regarding product safety, utility, and quality; (5) relationships to suppliers con-
cerning bribes, kickbacks, and competitive bidding; (6) relationships to employees with re-
gard to equal opportunity and fairness; (7) internal standards of behavior for corporate
employees and directors pertaining to conflicts of interest, insider information and the like.
Id. at 2-6.
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ing transforms social responsibility from a Product to an institutional-
ized Process. This institutionalization is an essential aspect of a Process
view of corporate social responsibility. It requires that the firm build
into and utilize in key aspects of its normal operating business practices
(particularly areas unregulated by government) structure and practices
that require it to consider decision criteria that were once thought
"exogenous" or irrelevant. Within the last few years, for example, a
number of corporate lenders have begun to review both their loan port-
folios and individual loan decisions on the basis of the social conse-
quences of their loan policies. One major Northern California-based
bank, Wells Fargo, has established a senior management-level commit-
tee to review the social consequences of proposed loan packages. Both
the institutionalization of broader nontraditional criteria into the cor-
porate decision process and the establishment of approaches for facili-
tating socially responsible decisionmaking within the company are new
developments. They appear, however, to indicate a trend. 33
The Rationality of Corporate Responsibility
In our recent book, Rationality, Legitimacy, Responsibility. The
Search for New Directions In Business And Society,34 Dow Votaw and I
suggested that business's responsibility to society is conceptually linked
with legitimacy and rationality. In this paper, I have indicated that
business must be accountable to interests both within and without it.
This accountability is essential to corporate legitimacy and to the pres-
ervation of a society that is democratic in fact as well as in theory. A
strong argument can be made that socially responsible corporate deci-
sionmaking in both the Process and Product senses represents rational
business behavior.
Rationality in this context has two distinctive meanings. First, it
denotes a decision process whereby the decisionmaker assesses all
available information in determining corporate action. The end sought
is the "better" decision; thus, makes "better" decisions-i.e. the deci-
33. The following works are illustrative of this newer, more process-oriented manage-
rial perspective of corporate social responsibilities: R. ACKERMAN, THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE
TO BUSINESS (1975); CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS: THE MODERN DILEMNA (Acker-
man & Bauer eds 1976) [hereinafter cited as Ackerman & Bauer]; L. PRESTON & J. POST,
PRIVATE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
(1975); MANAGING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (A. Carroll ed. 1977); Center for
Ethics and Social Policy, Graduate Theological Union (Berkeley, California), Institutional-
izing Corporate Social Responsibility (1978) (series of four Center papers); Purcell, Institu-
tionalizing Ethics on Corporate Boards, 36 REv. Soc. ECON. 41(1978).
34. Churchman, supra note 2, at 1-5.
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sion where, to the fullest extent possible, managers are cognizant of the
total ramifications of their policies and actions. We have examined this
point in the context of corporate social responsibility as Process. Sec-
ondly, rationality connotes a perspective that ties the long-run well-
being of business to the maintenance of an open, pluralistic, social and
political system in the United States. The concept of corporate respon-
sibility as Product conforms business behavior to ever-expanding socie-
tal expectations thereby minimizing further governmental controls and
enabling business organizations to retain greater autonomy to the bene-
fit of democratic pluralism.
Business behavior incompatible with emerging social norms has
often resulted in government regulation: employment discrimination,
environmental pollution, unfair labor practices, and restraints on mar-
ket competition are illustrative. Such governmentally determined
standards of corporate behavior may severely constrain managerial au-
tonomy and discretion, and be far more onerous to business than self-
regulation. Resort to the legal/political process to deal with areas of
nonresponsible business behavior has led an ever-rising concentration
of societal decisionmaking to be in the hands of governmental bodies,
thereby concentrating decisionmaking power in a democratic society.35
A broadened perspective of corporate social responsibility is also
rational in that it can buffer the firm from avoidable social dissonance
which frequently has cost and profit implications for the firm, makes
the manager's life more difficult, and subjects the organization to un-
necessary and avoidable strain. Business firms that have been obliged
to deal with disgruntled shareholders, customers, environmental
groups, and ethnic minorities bear witness to the difficulties involved.
The business community should not always wait to be caught in a reac-
tive and defensive posture in which its zone of discretion becomes very
limited. For business can develop its decisionmaking process, organi-
zational structures, and societal relations in a manner that meets chang-
35. Limitations inherent in governmental regulation as a means for accomplishing
many public objectives have been explored at length during the past few years. See, e.g.,
HoUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVER-
SIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, FEDERAL REGULATION AND REGULATORY REFORM, H.R.
Doc. No. 95-134, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES:
REGULATING BUSINESS: THE SEARCH FOR AN OPTIMUM (1978); P. MACAVOY, THE CRISIS
OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1970); M. WEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT
AND THE PUBLIC (1977); T. McCraw, Regulation in.4merica'A Review Article, 49 Bus. HIST.
REV. 159 (1975); R. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL. J. OF ECON. & MGT.
ScI. 335 (1974); American Bar Association, Commission on Law and the Economy, Federal
Regulation: Roads to Reform (Exposure Draft 1978).
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ing societal expectations without losing internal flexibility. 36 Whether
business does so or not will greatly affect the character and quality of
America's political economy. Responsible corporate social behavior, in
both the Product and Process senses, contributes to the legitimacy of
the corporation within American society and to its rational interaction
with other sectors of society.
I should now like to turn to the questions raised at the outset of
this Article: Are corporations the proper parties to be invested with car-
rying out public purposes? Do corporate goals need to be altered?
Have corporate goals and behavior changed as a result of public inter-
est challenges?
Part II
Corporations and Public Purpose
Are business corporations the proper parties to be invested with
carrying out public purposes? 37 In a sense the question is misleading,
for the word "invest" suggests that public purposes are exogenous to
the "normal" activity of the corporation, and that the corporation's un-
dertaking of the public purpose is discretionary. In fact, for both func-
tional reasons, arising from the character of the American political
economy, and historical reasons, public-purpose objectives are intrinsic
to the modem large corporation in the United States.
The Functional Basis of Corporate Public Purpose
The functional basis of corporate public purpose inheres in the
structure of the American political economy. Large organizations both
in the United States and in other advanced industrial societies are the
major mechanisms for producing and distributing essential goods and
services. Differences clearly exist between, for example, the Ford Mo-
tor Company, an American based multinational corporation; Toyota,
the Japanese industrial giant; British Leyland, a nationalized firm; and
Zil Auto Works, a Soviet state enterprise. These differences include
36. For additional discussions of the concept of organizational rationality, see C.
CHURCHMAN, CHALLENGE TO REASON 95-106 (1968); J. PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONAL DE-
SIGN 7-16 (1978); J. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 14-24 (1967); Churchman,
supra note 2; and Smelser, Reexamining the Parameters of Economic Activiy, in RATIONAL-
ITY, LEGITIMACY, RESPONSIBILITY: THE SEARCH FOR NEW DIRECTIONS IN BUSINESS AND
SOCIETY 7-51 (E. Epstein & D. Votaw eds. 1978).
37. See e.g., N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1973);
HEALD, supra note 18; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS PREDICAMENT (J. McKie
ed. 1974).
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their sources of capital, their relationships to state organs, the status
and role of their workers vis-a-vis the management of the organiza-
tions, and the utilization of income or absorption of losses resulting
from their operations. The common functional role that these organi-
zations share is, however, more striking than their differences. Each of
these entities performs the functionally identical task of aggregating
and deploying human, capital, technological, and organizational re-
sources to produce and distribute automotive products, an essential ac-
tivity in all economically advanced nations. In his useful analysis of
industrializing societies, Wilbert Moore notes that:
The integration of societies is more often functional than structural.
Functions essential to the survival of societies are performed-but by
patterns of action (structures) that have considerable variability from
one society to another, or from one time to another in the same sys-
tem. The general functional requirements for the persistence of any
society set only very wide limits on the appropriate structural ways of
accomplishing these requirements. This may be called theprinc~gle of
structural subst'tutabiliy which is the counterpart of the principle of
structural suitabili y.
38
Large American business corporations, although "private" enter-
prises, perform the great majority of essential economic tasks, which,
due to their very essentiality, are in many countries undertaken by the
state, either directly or through closely affiliated "public" entities. In
this country, business corporations produce and distribute all forms of
energy, (process all ferrous and nonferrous metals and derivative prod-
ucts, provide air, sea, motor, and, for the most part, intra-urban and
inter-city rail transportation, maintain radio, television, telephone, and
inter-continental satellite broadcasting services, and, finally, service vir-
tually all of the essential financial needs of the nation. Although rely-
ing on this technically "private sector" as the basic mechanism for
economic activity, and demonstrating a persistent ideological distaste
for state assumption for such functions, American society has sought to
both constrain our major businesses and render them accountable
through a variety of public controls and incentives. In those areas
where public regulation of business operations has been either unwork-
able or politically unattainable, diverse sectors of American society
have articulated ever-escalating standards of what constitutes the so-
cially responsible performance of business activities. However uncom-
fortable we may be with the attitude that "What is good for GM is
good for the country," it is not without basis. Millions of Americans
are directly or indirectly dependent upon the decisions of General Mo-
38. W. MOORE, THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY 83 (1965) (emphasis in original).
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tors, and other megacorporations, for essential products and services,
employment, the quantity and quality of U.S. military weaponry, re-
gional economic stability, and environmental quality.
It is therefore the structure of the American political economy,
which depends on large business corporations to perform society's most
essential economic tasks, that freights the megacorporation with public
purpose objectives. Indeed, it is in carrying out these concededly "nor-
mal" business activities that corporations confront the most important
questions regarding their being invested with "public purpose"
objectives.
39
The Historical Basis of Corporate Public Purpose
Let us turn now to the historical basis of corporate public purpose.
In a recent article, historian Ronald E. Seavoy demonstrates that
America's earliest business corporations, established at the end of the
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, were founded for
public service objectives40 such as improving overland transportation
through the establishment of turnpikes, 41 stagecoach companies, and
bridges; encouraging inland water transportation through the building
of canals; the safeguarding of public safety through the creation of
water companies and insurance corporations; providing a reliable
source of credit and currency by forming urban money banks and rural
land banks; and, finally, establishing manufacturing corporations to
both stimulate the domestic economy and free it of dependence on Brit-
ish and other foreign industry. Public service and profit seeking were
39. Within the past decade, this point has received increasing recognition within the
business community itself. See, e.g., Committee for Economic Development, Social Re-
sponsibilities of Business Corporations (1971); Bank of America Corporation, Code of Cor-
porate Conduct (1978); Caterpillar Tractor Co., A Code of Worldwide Business Conduct
(1974); Control Data Corporation, Social Responsibility Report (1978); Deere & Company,
Green Bulletin Series (1975); Working Paper for the Study of Corporate Policy and Govern-
ance, The Foundation of the Southwestern Graduate School of Banking, Southern Method-
ist University (E. Johnson, Project Director, June 1978). These objectives arise from the
structural role of large American business corporations, not as a consequence of any serious
inclination by most business leaders to extend their sphere of influence beyond the normal
operations of the firm.
40. HURST, supra note 8; Bruchey, The Quasi-Public Corporation.- "Corporation.- His-
torial Development," in THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ORDER: READINGS IN AMERICAN BusI-
NESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 140 (A. Chandler, S. Bruchey & L. Galambos eds. 1968);
Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation, 52 Bus. HIST. REV.
30 (1978). See also Handlin & Handlin, Origins of the American Business Corporation, 5 J.
ECON. HIST. 1 (1945).
41. The most frequently incorporated business in the first 30 years of the 19th century.
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compatible in early American corporations.42
Notwithstanding these public-service objectives, there was con-
siderable suspicion of and hostility toward the corporation. This early
antipathy did not derive from corporate status per se but from the mo-
nopoly privileges enjoyed by many corporations. Thus, as Hurst points
out:
We delegated functions of broad public interest to private franchise
holders in order to get jobs done. At the same time recognizing the
potential power conferred-we were distrustful of our delegates pre-
cisely because their special privileges of action put them outside
usual market disciplines and hence gave them some of the character
of sovereignty.
43
Notwithstanding these ambivalent feelings, by the end of the nine-
teenth century, general incorporation acts had replaced special charter
procedures and the corporation became a ubiquitous business form.
During the post-Civil War period, corporate law reflected the view that
corporate status had no social relevance "save as a device legitimated
by its utility to private business."44 The advent of the megacorpora-
tion, however, gave rise to concern about the societal role of the now
omnipresent large business enterprise.
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw federal and
state legislative efforts, many of them successful, to constrain corporate
excesses and resuscitate the notion of responsibility as an essential cri-
terion of corporate legitimacy. Regulatory law became the primary ve-
hicle for redefining the relationship between the business enterprise
and the employees, consumers, and other groups affected by corporate
operations. Antitrust acts, industrial wage, hour, and safety statutes,
and environmental legislation exemplify the efforts of our Progressive
Era predecessors to render business enterprise more responsible and
accountable to the public. 45 According to Alfred D. Chandler, the
dean of American business historians, the modem business enterprise
"has had very little political support among the American electorate
• . . [and] [a]t least until the 1940s . . . grew in spite of public and
governmental opposition."46 Widespread public concern with the role
of the modem business enterprise grew steadily, through a period
marked by two world wars, the Great Depression and the rise of an
42. See Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation, 52
Bus. HIST. REv. 30 (1978).
43. HURST, supra note 8, at 43.
44. Id. at 70.
45. See generaly R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1945).
46. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REvOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 497 (1977).
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effective labor movement, and peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Historian Morrell Heald points out that: "What the nineteenth century
lacked, and what the twentieth was to supply, was a rationale-a con-
cept of the relationship of business to the community-in which social
responsibility was clearly seen as a charge not merely upon individual
conscience.
47
By the end of the 1970s we have almost come full circle. Just as
the earliest corporations had an explicit public-service component, the
operations and impact of modem large business enterprise have an in-
herently public nature. This public-service character results from the
functional delegation within the American political economy of essen-
tial economic tasks to the modem large corporation, and a long-stand-
ing and deeply felt need of a significant element of the American public
to limit corporate power and render it accountable. The primary mech-
anisms for constraining corporate power have been the regulatory laws
established through the political process and the escalating public de-
mand for "corporate social responsibility."
Given these historical origins and present character of the Amei-
can political economy, large business corporations are now invested
necessarily with carrying out public purposes.
Do Corporate Goals Need to be Altered?
The social function of the large corporation within the American
political economy has been to produce and distribute necessary goods
and services. As we have seen, to a degree not found in virtually any
other advanced industrial society, the United States depends on the
nonstate, investor-owned business corporation to perform the essential
economic tasks required for societal preservation and well-being. Al-
though this fundamentally economic end of corporate activity has re-
mained constant for over a century, the means by which the corporate
enterprise pursues its goals have changed. Corporations have been
obliged to revise their short-term and intermediate objectives as socie-
tal expectations have changed. These changes have affected business
operations in:
(1) the nature of the employment relationship, including the
terms, conditions, and environment of work, together with the
reciprocal rights and obligations of the work relationship.
(2) the relationship between producers/distributors and pur-
chaser/consumers regarding the nature, quality and conse-
47. HEALD, supra note 18, at 19.
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quences of goods and services channelled through the
marketplace.
(3) the character of the production/distribution process, espe-
cially as it pertains to the firm's impact on the physical
environment.
(4) the relationship between the business firm and its sharehold-
ers, particularly as it involves the rights of the latter to assert
claims against and to hold corporate management to high
standards of performance.
(5) the standing and ability of diverse sectors of the public, in-
cluding minority groups, women, and other persons affected
by the operations of the firm, to assert claims against it by
means of the class-action suit and other legal devices.
(6) what constitutes permissible forms of competition within the
marketplace; both the legal process and changing trade cus-
toms and usage have altered standards of acceptable market
behavior.
(7) the interaction of business organizations with all levels of do-
mestic (local, regional, state and national) and foreign
governments.
Virtually every element of business operations (both internal and exter-
nal) has been affected by rapidly shifting societal expectations of corpo-
rate behavior.
Corporate reformers have proposed a variety of changes in the
governance structure of the corporation. These proposals have in-
cluded the mandatory federal chartering of corporations, the establish-
ment of federal minimum standards legislation for corporations,
requiring public, independent, employee, or constituency group direc-
tors on corporate boards, instituting of a two-tiered management board
structure, such as that found in a number of Western European nations,
and requiring that the business firm explain its multiple responsibili-
ties, either through the corporate charter or by reporting to a govern-
ment regulatory body. These suggestions seek to institutionalize new
standards of conduct, nontraditional participants, and novel organiza-
tional objectives into the corporate decisionmaking process. Stone
grasps the essential importance of this in his comment that "[t]he pro-
ponents of corporate responsibility do wrong to put so much emphasis
on what corporations are deciding rather than on how they are decid-
ing--the corporate decision process itself.' 48 This analysis is consistent
48. STONF, supra note 14, at 217.
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with viewing corporate social responsibility as a Process as well as
Product. Proposed modifications in corporate structure and govern-
ance are, accordingly, attempts to change process ("how-to") goals
rather than efforts to alter the fundamental economic and societal ob-
jective of the business corporation. The means used to pursue these
economic objectives must encompass contemporary societal expecta-
tions. Thus, while the "profit orientation [is] a basic and inalienable
fact of American corporate life," "sheer corporate hedonism" is no
longer acceptable.
4 9
The widely heralded statement, "Social Responsibilities of Busi-
ness Corporations," issued by the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment (CED) in early 1971, recognized the corporation's fundamentally
economic raison d'etre. While setting forth a "fresh and enlightened
point of view about the role of business as an important instrument for
social programs in our pluralistic society," the CED's underlying as-
sumption remained: "that business serves society mainly through carry-
ing out its basic functions of producing goods and services and
generating wealth that improves the nation's standard of living."
50
A key objective of public policy vis-a-vis business corporations
during the 1980s should be to preserve their basic economic functions
while assuring a process that, to the fullest extent possible, eliminates
the deleterious effects of corporate policies and practices. Proposed re-
forms in corporate structure and governance and suggestions for new
controls of business activity should be judged by this public-policy ob-
jective. The fundamental societal goals of the business corporation
have not altered in the past century nor need they do so in the foresee-
able future. Rather, it is the means by which business firms pursue
these goals, the complex process of corporate decisionmaking and ac-
tion, that have changed and will continue to change as public expecta-
tions regarding what constitutes socially responsible business behavior
in both the Product and Process senses expands.
Corporations and Public Interest Challenges
Recent literature pertaining to the modern corporation has attrib-
uted great importance to the attempts of diverse social interests to
achieve more socially responsible business behavior.5' One study sum-
49. Id. at 230.
50. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BusI-
NESS CORPORATIONS 9-10 (1971).
51. See, e.g., Ackerman & Bauer, supra note 33; L. PRESTON & J. POST, PRIVATE MAN-
AGEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY (1975); D. Vo-
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marizes their significance as follows:
[T]he activities of interest organizations largely determine the state of
social responsibility of firms in modem urban society. They monitor
the impacts of the firm on the constituents whom they represent, play
a primary role in the mobilization and direction of social responses,
interact directly and indirectly with the firm, seek concessions and
reforms, communicate concerns and values, and review implementa-
tion. Most critically, interest organizations function as arbiters of so-
cial responsibility.
5 2
Among the many factors that have required corporate managers to
reconsider the social responsibilities of the business enterprise during
the past two decades, few have been as dramatic as the activities of
public-interest organizations. While disparate in constituency, number,
and composition, operational methods and style, longevity, effective-
ness, financial and other organizational resources, and specific goals
each organization has a fundamental operating assumption that busi-
ness must function in a manner compatible to some broader concept of
public purpose.5 3 These public-interest groups come in many forms:
not-for-profit law and accounting firms, church-related bodies, ad hoc
organizations concerned with particular aspects of business perform-
ance (e.g. environmental pollution, affirmative action, investments in
South Africa), and institutionalized entities such as the various "study
groups" affiliated with Ralph Nader. Their techniques include law
suits, mass-media publicity campaigns, shareholder proxy-solicitation
drives, consumer boycotts, and direct and indirect political action.
5 4
GEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS AUTHORITY (1978)
[hereinafter cited as VOGEL]; Crawford & Gram, SocialResponsibility as Interorganizational
Transaction, 3 ACAD. MGT. RaV. 880 (1978); Schocker & Sethi, An Approach to Incorporat-
ing Societal Preferences in Developing Corporate Action Strategies, in THE UNSTABLE
GROUND: CORPORATE SOCIAL POLICY IN A DYNAMIC SOCIETY 67 (Sethi ed. 1974).
52. Crawford & Gram, Social Responsibility as Interorganizational Transaction, 3
ACAD. MGT. REV. 880, 881 (1978).
53. In his recent study, Andrew S. McFarland suggests the difficulties in giving a "re-
ally good, analytical definition of public interest lobby," and proposes a "usage definition"
that defines the term according to the way it is used among politicians in Washington. A.
MCFARLAND, PUBLIC INTEREST LOBBIES: DECISION MAKING ON ENERGY 40 (1976) [herein-
after cited as MCFARLAND]. In my discussion, I have adopted his highly useful, albeit still
imperfect, "usage definition." According to McFarland, "A public interest lobby is one that
seeks to represent general interests or those of the whole public; does not chiefly represent
some specific economic interest; and is not a lobby in one of the following traditional catego-
ries: religion, ethnic groups, race, regional interests, women's rights, avocational groups and
perhaps others. Id. at 40-41 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
54. These and other public interest group efforts vis-a-vis American corporations are
discussed in VOGEL, supra note 51; P. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY: ESSAYS ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1972); R. HEIL-
BRONER, IN THE NAME OF PROFIT (1972); McFARLAND, supra note 53; Up AGAINST THE
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Among the more spectacular, and best publicized, of recent public in-
terest group undertakings have been activities intended:
(1) to change or terminate American corporate operations in
South Africa and Rhodesia;
(2) to improve the percentages and levels of minority and female
employment in U.S. corporations;
(3) to curtail, eliminate or disclose certain forms of business po-
litical behavior (e.g. lobbying activities, election campaign
contributions and expenditures, and foreign political payoffs
and involvements);
(4) to challenge the militarily-related activities of U.S. companies
during the Viet Nam war;
(5) to prevent American-based companies from complying with
the Arab economic boycott of Israel;
(6) to modify the composition and operations of corporate
boards of directors; and
(7) to prevent U.S. public utilities seeking energy alternatives to
fossil fuels from developing nuclear reactor facilities.
Typically, public interest efforts have sought to "reform" the Prod-
uct or end results of corporate activity. On occasion, however, they
have been directed toward altering the Process of corporate decision-
making. Examples of the latter phenomenon are Campaign GM and
the successful effort by shareholders of both the Northrop Corporation
and Phillips Petroleum, and their public-interest allies, to require a ma-
jority of outside directors on the company board; these moves followed
the disclosure of illegal, company campaign contributions during the
1972 elections.
55
It is relatively easy to document "public interest" initiatives be-
cause of the coverage they have received in the mass media and the
reliable information available as a result of the monitoring activities of
professional corporate-watcher groups such as the Washington D.C.-
based Investor Responsibility Research Center and the Council on Ec-
onomic Priorities in New York. It is difficult to determine whether cor-
porations actually change their policies in response to public-interest
challenges. Fortunately, studies by political scientists, Andrew S. Mc-
Farland and David Vogel, 56 provide useful insights regarding the effi-
CORPORATE WALL: MODERN CORPORATIONS AND SOCIAL ISSUES OF THE SEVENTIES (Sethi
ed. 3d ed. 1977).
55. VOGEL, supra note 51, at 71-89, 111-15; Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Con-
test. Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1971).
56. MCFARLAND, supra note 53; VOGEL, supra note 51.
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cacy of this "public interest" movement. McFarland examined the role
of seven diverse, mass-membership, public-interest organizations in
shaping U.S. energy policy during the decade 1965-1975. While recog-
nizing that public-interest groups are the current manifestations of a
tendency in American politics for citizens' collective action that dates
back at least a century,57 McFarland points out that the amount of in-
fluence these groups have acquired in the relatively short period of
roughly a decade is a new development. He notes the central role that
public-interest organizations have had in delaying the Alaskan Pipe-
line, in changing the rules for financing election campaigns, and in
securing passage of various forms of auto safety, environmental protec-
tion, and consumer legislation.
McFarland concludes that "public interest groups appear to have a
significant impact on the process of making policy with respect to en-
ergy"58 and will continue to be influential in the near future. The pri-
mary constituency of public interest groups, college-educated, middle-
class individuals, remains skeptical about the quality of American gov-
ernment. Both the leadership and the membership of these groups
tend, moreover, to view politics according to a: "civic-balance system of
beliefs--the belief that many policies are controlled by special interests
and that the function of public interest groups is to counteract the
power of special interests for the benefit of the public at large. ' 59 These
groups often function together through the formation of ad hoc coali-
tions specific to particular policies and issues. Future public-interest
groups, McFarland predicts, are likely to be dynamic, new types of or-
ganizations, mobilizing political attitudes and concerns not currently
represented. While purporting to act for the public interest, notes Mc-
Farland, these groups usually do not represent all the public-interest
positions on a given policy issue; indeed, there may be several "public
interest" positions ranged on various sides of a question. Finally, he
suggests that public-interest groups may accelerate the pace of social
change within American society.
A consequence of this anticipated corporate-public-interest con-
frontation will be a further expansion of what Phillip I. Blumberg and
David Vogel have designated as the "politicalization of the corpora-
57. Indeed, a half century after the founding of the American Republic, de Toqueville
noted that "Americans of all ages, all conditions and dispositions constantly form associa-
tions" for their individual and mutual good. II A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 114 (Random House ed. 1954).
58. MCFARLAND, supra note 53, at 107.
59. Id. at 108.
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tion."60 This politicalization is a manifestation of the widely-held view
among social activists and middle-class citizens alike during the 1960s
and 1970s that the megacorporation is primarily a social rather than
economic entity, and that its behavior can be most effectively influ-
enced by political techniques. These techniques range from disrupting
corporate meetings and the physical destruction of corporate facilities
to utilizing the mass media and corporate proxy machinery to change
the policies of the corporate leadership or, failing that, the leadership
itself. Politicalization therefore seeks to affect both the corporation's
internal governance structure and its external behavior-the Product
and Process of corporate activity.
A number of highly publicized challenges to the corporate com-
munity during the past decade and a half are generally regarded as
victories for their public-interest protagonists. These include Cam-
paign GM, an omnibus campaign directed at virtually the total spec-
trum of General Motors operations from automobile safety to the
company's social policies in the United States and abroad; the confron-
tation during the mid-1960s between FIGHT, a black activist group,
and its primarily church-affiliated allies and Eastman Kodak regarding
the latter's employment and community-related policies; and the
American Jewish Congress's efforts to persuade American corporations
not to comply with the Arab economic boycott of Israel. Notwithstand-
ing these and other triumphs for public-interest challenges two critical
issues remain.
The first relates to the overall impact of public-interest activities
upon corporate behavior; the second pertains to the implications of the
corporate public interest movement for public control of the American
business corporation. A recently published study by David Vogel deals
with both of these points.6 1 Vogel examines a wide range of public-
interest efforts during the 1960s and 1970s, including Campaign GM,
FIGHT-Kodak and American Jewish Congress' challenge, and
concludes:
All its brave rhetoric notwithstanding, the corporate accountability
movement can hardly be regarded as a serious threat to corporate
authority in the United States. . . .What is most striking about the
corporate accountability movement is the modesty of its demands on
business. . . . In reality, citizen pressures challenge the judgment of
management, not its power.
62
60. VOGEL, supra note 51, at 3-20; P. Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation,
51 B.U.L. REV. 425 (1971).
61. VOGEL, supra note 51.
62. Id. at 222-23.
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These challenges, Vogel contends, do not address such fundamen-
tal issues as: the corporation's "for profit" orientation, the existence of
private property rights, the distribution of power within the corpora-
tion, and the relationship between the corporation and other sectors of
society. Vogel posits that public-interest pressures have only been able
to change corporate behavior "primarily to the extent to which their
demands on business expand or complement those required by law."
'63
The support of the state, rather than the individual or collective efforts
of citizens, has, according to this analysis, been the key factor in public-
interest successes. This dependence on the state action is ironic since it
was, presumably, business domination of many areas of governmental
decisionmaking that led to the direct citizens' efforts. Vogel argues that
"direct intervention by the government '64 and more effective public
control over the exercise of corporate economic power, not citizens' ac-
tion, are the sine quo non of corporate accountability. He concludes
that the real significance of public-interest challenges to the corporation
has been to influence public policy through citizen participation and
publicity, not to effect direct changes in corporate decisions. McFar-
land's and Vogel's studies confirm my longstanding view that corporate
managers respond to actual or anticipated societal pressures precisely
to the degree they perceive as necessary to stave off or ameliorate chal-
lenges to their autonomy. Corporate managers are, to use Neil Cham-
berlain's term, incrementalists. 65 They will do what they perceive to be
necessary to enable the firm to pursue its ordinary business activities
with a minimum of unsettling interference from dissonant elements.
As Jeffrey Pfeffer has pointed out in a recent book, an organization's
survival requires it to maintain "favorable exchange relationships with
other groups and organizations in the environment." 66 Creative corpo-
rate management pursues a multi-faceted strategy to achieve those
"favorable exchange relationships": it seeks to reduce uncertainty
about our environment, to enhance the corporation's perceived legiti-
macy among pertinent constituencies, and, when necessary, to alter
public policy through the political process. The objective of such
"boundary spanning" activities is to enable the firm to pursue effica-
ciously the economic goals on which a business corporation's survival
depends and on which society relies.
Empirical research on the impact of public-interest groups upon
63. Id. at 224.
64. Id. at 225.
65. N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LIMIT OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 198-200 (1973).
66. J. PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 112 (1978).
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corporate goals and behavior suggests that these groups have only a
marginal effect in altering business policies and practices. They have
been significantly more successful, however, in indirectly influencing
corporate objectives and operations by stimulating changes in public
policies and energizing governmental bodies to implement existing
standards. Public-interest organizations also have been quite helpful in
monitoring corporate actions, in dramatizing instances of improper
conduct, and in serving as independent sources of pressure for change.
Finally, they have articulated the changing public expectations of the
role of the megacorporation in contemporary society. Thus, although it
is not as powerful or effective as both advocates and detractors suggest,
the public-interest movement has, nevertheless, enhanced the quality of
corporate social responsibility in the United States.
Conclusion: Corporate Social Responsibility During the 1980s
There is little likelihood that public concern regarding the social
responsibilities of the megacorporation will fade away in the forthcom-
ing decade. The large business corporation remains an anomolous in-
stitution within the American democratic tradition. Although public
discussion concerning the power and legitimacy of the corporate enter-
prise is not nearly so strident today as it was a decade ago, the century-
old underlying questions concerning the societal role of corporations
remain. Indeed, given this country's complex set of social and political
values, it is doubtful that the debate over corporate power and legiti-
macy can ever be concluded, absent a fundamental and, in the Ameri-
can context, profoundly revolutionary reordering of our political and
economic institutions. There does not appear to be any present clam-
our for such a restructuring of the American version of capitalism. A
recent study of public opinion in the United States by political scien-
tists Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider indicates, "Even if
the public has lost much of its faith in thepeople who run major corpo-
rations, they certainly have not abandoned hope in the free enterprise
system itself."67 Major corporations will continue to be the basic
mechanism for producing and distributing goods and services. The
American public does, however, want large business to subordinate
self-interest to the more altruistic public interest. Further, according to
the Lipset-Schneider analysis, there is a wide-spread feeling that "big-
ness" means "badness" and that the concentration of power in the
67. Lipset & Schneider, supra note 10, at 41 (emphasis in original).
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hands of the self-interested is inherently dangerous.68 Although the
Lipset-Sctneider study reveals that public confidence in "big labor"
and "big government," is also at a low ebb, large business firms will not
be shielded from public pressure for responsible corporate behavior
during the 1980s thereby. Paradoxically, in view of the public's misgiv-
ings about the performance of "big government," the state, in all its
branches, will continue to play a crucial role in developing and enforc-
ing standards of corporate social responsibility. Public expectations
concerning acceptable business behavior will continue to escalate.
Notwithstanding the traditional American ideological reservations
about government "interference" with the activities of "private" insti-
tutions, state action will remain the primary mechanism for rendering
corporations accountable. Public-interest groups will continue to play
a significant role, both by catalyzing state action and by serving as in-
dependent sources of pressure upon the firm. Corporate social respon-
sibility will continue to be on the agenda of public and business
concerns.
Furthermore, the institutionalization of societally oriented corpo-
rate decision-making will be undoubtedly one of the key features of the
further development of the corporate social responsibility concept dur-
ing the 1980s. Although hardly a panacea and subject to the criticsm of
tokenism and cooptation, incremental changes in the composition of
corporate boards by the inclusion of various types of qualified "constit-
uency" and "public" directors such as women, minorities, employees,
or community leaders could serve both to broaden the base and widen
the perspective of corporate decision-making. Similarly, a federal char-
tering act or federal minimum-standards legislation, if drafted sensibly,
could facilitate effective governmental oversight of corporate action
without impairing management's ability to run the corporation profita-
bly. It is imperative that corporate managers maintain a realistically
comprehensive view of the impact of corporate institutions upon soci-
ety. I share the view of Robert Ackerman and the late Raymond Bauer
that "the overriding responsibility of the corporate leader to society and
stockholder alike. . . is the development of policies and administrative
skills that will enable the firm to respond effectively to social demands
without destroying its capability to produce goods and services."'69 The
ability of corporations and their managers to accomplish this objective
while reconciling diverse, dynamic, and demanding constituencies will
68. Id. at 46.
69. Ackerman & Bauer, supra note 33, at 31 (emphasis in original).
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be a crucial test of socially responsible business behavior during the
1980s. Firms must balance continually their traditional economic goals
with ever-broadening social expectations.
Corporate reformers and managers alike must strive to institution-
alize substantively and operationally useful changes in the structure
and governance of the megacorporation that facilitate responsible cor-
porate behavior, both as Process and Product. Only then will the large
business corporations of the 1980s meet both our national economic
needs and our societal expectations.
